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Causal Inference Through Potential
Outcomes and Principal Stratification:
Application to Studies with “Censoring”
Due to Death1
Donald B. Rubin
Abstract. Causal inference is best understood using potential out-
comes. This use is particularly important in more complex settings,
that is, observational studies or randomized experiments with compli-
cations such as noncompliance. The topic of this lecture, the issue of
estimating the causal effect of a treatment on a primary outcome that
is “censored” by death, is another such complication. For example, sup-
pose that we wish to estimate the effect of a new drug on Quality of
Life (QOL) in a randomized experiment, where some of the patients
die before the time designated for their QOL to be assessed. Another
example with the same structure occurs with the evaluation of an ed-
ucational program designed to increase final test scores, which are not
defined for those who drop out of school before taking the test. A fur-
ther application is to studies of the effect of job-training programs on
wages, where wages are only defined for those who are employed. The
analysis of examples like these is greatly clarified using potential out-
comes to define causal effects, followed by principal stratification on
the intermediated outcomes (e.g., survival).
Key words and phrases: Missing data, quality of life, Rubin causal
model, truncation due to death.
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the first at Carnegie Mellon University on Septem-
ber 16, the Morris DeGroot Memorial Lecture, and
the second at the Washington, D.C., Chapter of the
American Statistical Association’s Morris Hansen
Memorial Lecture, November 2. Both were truly en-
joyable and stimulating occasions for me, not only
the presentations themselves, but the warm events
following them. I am extremely grateful to the two
selection committees for inviting me, to the relatives
of both Morrises, and to the very good friends who
shared time with me in Pittsburgh and Washington.
The basic material in the talk had been presented
a couple of previous times before the first “Mor-
ris” talk in Pittsburgh, so it was fairly polished,
I thought, and thus worthy of memorial lectures
honoring these two wonderful statisticians and good
1
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friends. Also, the content was rather broadly acces-
sible and relevant to both men’s interests.
I do not know whether Morrie (DeGroot) or Mor-
ris (Hansen) knew each other well or not; they tended
to travel in different statistical circles, Morrie more
in the Bayesian decision theory, academic statistics
world, and Morris more in the survey design, gov-
ernment statistics world, but they were both very
influential and widely admired.
A few words about Morrie first, partly because
the Morrie talk was first, but also because I met
Morrie first, although I was certainly familiar with
both names as a graduate student at Harvard in the
late 1960s. In 1976 Morrie became Editor of Journal
of the American Statistical Association, Theory and
Methods, and he contacted me to stay on as an As-
sociate Editor—of course, I was thrilled and agreed.
But I wondered why because I didn’t really know
him at all. He explained that when he had been a
JASA Associate Editor earlier, he had sent me var-
ious papers to review, and he liked the reports that
I wrote. In particular, one sequence of papers that
he sent me to review was on a topic that I had felt
was completely old-fashioned and unimportant, and
my reviews repeatedly said so. I had asked Morrie
at that time why he kept sending them to me since
I didn’t like them. And he replied that besides me,
there appeared to be only two kinds of possible re-
viewers: the vast majority who refused to read the
submissions because they were negative about the
area and didn’t want to waste their own time; and
a very few who loved the boring material because
it was what they did and therefore would uncrit-
ically recommend publication. Morrie wanted am-
munition to recommend rejection, which would be
difficult with only positive reviews, and I was pro-
viding that ammunition! As Editor, he promised to
use me more efficiently except when a paper on this
particular topic arrived.
There are many other Morrie stories available,
some from the very early Bayesian meetings in Va-
lencia, a quarter of a century ago. One has Mor-
rie explaining at his after-dinner talk how he could
manage to stay up partying every night until the
wee hours of the morning, consuming alcohol and
smoking cigars, and still arise for an early breakfast,
more jovial and energetic than those half his age—
he explained that it was simple: practice, practice,
practice. Good advice I’ve tried to follow.
My experience with Morris was more limited, and
involved discussions and meetings often stimulated
by survey nonresponse issues, or by his advisory
roles at the Census, or on government committees.
He was always warm but principled, with a keen de-
sire to see statistics used to address important real-
world problems. In many ways, he reminded me of
my wonderful Ph.D. advisor, Bill Cochran, with re-
spect to having similar attitudes toward the field of
statistics and the problems it should be addressing.
I think that the topic of today’s talk, and I hope,
the presentation itself, would be of interest to both
of these pillars of twentieth century statistics.
1. INTRODUCTION TO DATA THAT ARE
“CENSORED” OR “TRUNCATED” DUE TO
DEATH
There are several themes in this presentation that
are quite general. First, the proper analysis of com-
plicated randomized experiments can often take on
many of the features of the proper analysis of non-
randomized (observational) data; in both, covariates
play an important role, which is often unappreci-
ated. Second, it is critical to give adequate concep-
tual thought to any nonstandard statistical prob-
lem before attacking it with mathematical analysis
or available computer programs. As Picasso said:
“computers are worthless; they only give answers.”
(Thanks to Stuart Baker for first pointing out this
great quote.) And third, intermediate outcome vari-
ables, which arise frequently in practice but often
remain unrecognized, are not easy to handle well;
in fact, the giant of statistics, Sir Ronald Fisher,
gave flawed advice about them throughout his ca-
reer (Rubin, 2005). To be fair, however, nearly all
researchers I have read have also failed to provide
good advice on this tricky topic of intermediate out-
come variables, and Fisher appeared never to have
focused any real attention on it.
One generic example of a complicated randomized
experiment with an intermediate outcome variable
is the specific topic of this presentation, and can
be labeled as involving “censoring” or “truncation”
of data due to death. For instance, the patient in
the experiment dies after treatment assignment, but
before the primary outcome variable, say Quality
of Life (QOL) two years after assignment, can be
measured. An artificial example of this will be used
throughout this presentation.
Examples of such censoring also exist in other
fields. For instance, suppose that we were interested
in the effect of a special educational intervention in
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high school on final test scores, and some of the stu-
dents in a randomized experiment evaluating this
intervention do not finish high school. Or in some
economics situations, interest focuses on the causal
effect of a job-training program on wages (not in-
come), which are only well defined for those peo-
ple who are employed; thus, people who are unem-
ployed when wages are measured have their wage
outcome data “censored” or “truncated.” Or, sup-
pose in a study of the effects of hormone replace-
ment therapy (HRT) on five-year cancer-free sur-
vival, some women die before five years, but are
cancer-free when they die, say, of heart disease at
three years. As this short list of examples makes
clear, this type of complication can and does arise
in many circumstances.
My first contact with this specific issue was in the
context of a consulting project in the early 1990s
for AMGEN for a product for the treatment of ALS
(amyotrophic lateral sclerosis) or “Lou Gehrig’s
Disease”—see a brief discussion in Rubin (2000),
and prior to that in Rubin (1998). ALS is a progres-
sive neuromuscular disease that eventually destroys
motor neurons, and death follows, typically from
lungs that are unable to operate. No good treat-
ments were (or are) available. In the AMGEN ex-
ample, the active treatment, say product T, was to
be compared to the control treatment, C, where the
primary outcome was QOL two years post-rando-
mization, as measured by “forced vital capacity”
(FVC), essentially, how big a balloon you can blow
up when you are alive. When FVC is large, you
can typically get on fairly well, whereas when this
is small, you are in very bad shape. In fact, many
people do not reach the end-point of two-year post-
randomization survival, and so two-year QOL is
“truncated” or “censored” by death. I was brought
into this project because, as sometimes is the case,
the unavailable QOL data were trying to be fit into
a “missing data” framework.
Before continuing with this example, it is help-
ful to state that the general attack on this problem
being presented here uses the framework of “prin-
cipal stratification” (Frangakis and Rubin, 2002).
The specific technical work on this topic was initi-
ated in a Ph.D. thesis at Harvard University (Zhang,
2002), and follow-up work appears in Zhang and
Rubin (2003) and Zhang, Rubin and Mealli (2005,
2006). These references provide discussion of other
techniques that have been proposed to attack this
problem, and why those techniques are generally
deficient relative to the principal stratification ap-
proach presented here. We only briefly review these
other deficient approaches later, after setting up a
correct framework.
The key idea of principal stratification is to strat-
ify on the intermediate outcome, here the indicators
for two-year survival, but not on the observed two-
year survival, which is an outcome generally affected
by the treatment received. Rather we should stratify
on the bivariate outcome: survival if assigned active
treatment, survival if assigned control treatment.
This bivariate outcome is not affected by the treat-
ment received, even though which of the two out-
comes is actually observed is affected by the treat-
ment received. Thus, in our running example there
are four principal strata representing four types of
people: those who will live no matter how treated
(LL), those who will die no matter how treated (DD),
those who will live if treated but die if not treated
(LD), and those who will die if treated but live oth-
erwise (DL). A specific artificial case is displayed in
Table 1 and will be used for most of this article. It is
chosen to be relatively extreme to make points more
dramatically; it does not realistically represent any
data from the AMGEN trial, which originally moti-
vated this approach.
2. THE RUNNING EXAMPLE
Table 1 presents the hypothetical truth, and dis-
plays what would happen to the group of people in
Table 1
Principal strata among the patients
% Principal Treatment Control Treatment effect
population stratum Si(T) Y¯i(T) Si(C ) Y¯i(C ) on QOL
20 LL L 900 L 700 200
40 LD L 600 D * *
20 DL D * L 800 *
20 DD D * D * *
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each principal stratum under both the active treat-
ment and the control treatment. Of course, for any
person we can only observe the “potential outcomes”
under one or the other treatment, not both—the
fundamental problem facing (Rubin, 1978, § 2.4;
Holland, 1986, §3). Holland called the general per-
spective to causal inference presented here the “Ru-
bin Causal Model” (RCM) for a series of papers
written in the 1970s expounding and expanding this
perspective (Rubin, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978,
1979, 1980); Table 1 assumes “SUTVA” (Rubin,
1980, 1990), the stable-unit-treatment-value assump-
tion, or stability; this assumption is very commonly
made.
The first row of Table 1 shows that 20% of the
population will live under either treatment, as indi-
cated by the survival potential outcomes S(T ) = L
and S(C) = L; S(T ) is the potential outcome for
survival when assigned treatment and S(C) is the
potential outcome for survival when assigned con-
trol. For these LL people, the average Y (i.e., QOL)
if all were treated would be 900, which is good, but
would be 700 if not treated, which is fair. Therefore,
the average causal effect of the treatment for the LL
stratum is 900− 700 = 200, as indicated in the last
column. This will be called the SACE—the survivor
average causal effect. Critically, a causal effect must
be a comparison of treatment potential outcomes,
Y (T ), and control potential outcomes, Y (C), on a
COMMON subset of units, here the set of LL units.
The LD units, displayed in the second row of Ta-
ble 1, are those who would die under control but
live under treatment [i.e., S(T ) =L and S(C) =D],
and they comprise 40% of the population. If these
units were all treated, their average QOL would be
600, which is poor, but if they were not treated,
they would die, and their QOL would be undefined
(or defined on the sample space of the positive real
numbers extended to include an asterisk). To assign
a particular value to QOL when dead is to assume
we know how to trade off a particular QOL and be-
ing dead (and out of misery). Not only do we not
know how to do this, but the trade-off could vary
by individual, so we prefer simply to represent the
actual truth at this point, and not bring in such
extraneous value judgments.
The third row of Table 1 is for those who would
die under treatment but live under control, those in
the DL group with S(T ) =D and S(C) = L. These
subjects comprise 20% of the population, and their
average QOL under control is a quite decent 800.
And the final 20% represented in the fourth row are
in the DD group, who would die no matter which
treatment they received.
A well-defined real value for the average causal ef-
fect of the active treatment versus the control treat-
ment on QOL exists only for the LL group. For
the LD and DL groups, the average causal effect
on QOL involves the aforementioned trade-offs with
death, and for the DD group there is no QOL to
compare, so the causal effect on QOL for them must
be zero. The most that we can ever hope to learn in
any study of this population of values under these
two treatments is recover this table of values.
Before considering how to do this, however, let us
examine this table a bit more. First, the active treat-
ment is better for survival than the control treat-
ment because 60% (20% LL+ 40% LD) would sur-
vive when treated, whereas only 40% (20% LL +
20% DL) would survive if not treated (control).
Thus the active treatment is better for overall sur-
vival, and the active treatment is better for QOL
for the subset of people where it is well defined, the
LL group, by +200. Therefore, with no more infor-
mation about possible subgroup differences, such as
differences between males versus females, the treat-
ment is preferable for the population.
Notice also in this example that even if all four
groups had been the same size, each representing a
quarter of the population, the treatment still would
have been preferred to control. The reason is that,
although there would have been no treatment ver-
sus control difference on overall survival, treatment
would have a positive causal effect on QOL for the
only subgroup where it is well defined. If, in this
case, an * were imputed with 0, the conclusion would
have been that there is no benefit to the active treat-
ment for either survival or QOL because the last col-
umn would have averaged to zero (200+600−800+
0)/4 = 0, a conclusion that conflates facts with value
judgments. This conclusion would be especially de-
ceptive if conclusions from this population were to
be generalized to future healthier populations dom-
inated by people like those in the LL group; this of-
ten can occur in real-world clinical trials, where ex-
perimental drugs are first tried with sicker patients,
and approval is based on results with these patients,
but if approved, the drugs are used in broader and
healthier populations.
Continuing with the examination of Table 1, un-
der treatment the healthiest group is the LL group,
followed by the LD group; the DL and DD groups
CAUSAL INFERENCE THROUGH POTENTIAL OUTCOMES 5
both die when treated. However, under control the
DL group is healthier than the LL group, and both
of these groups are healthier than the LD and DD
groups, whose members die under control. Can this
be realistic? The answer is “yes” for at least two
reasons: First, some drugs do have negative side ef-
fects for some subgroups of people, and so here that
would be the DL subgroup, who would survive if un-
treated. Another possible reason is that the active
treatment may make some people feel so much bet-
ter, even though it does not affect their disease pro-
gression, that they “overdo” it—play tennis, go to
parties, have normal sex lives, and so on. There are
some drugs that can have effects like this; Epogen,
another product made by AMGEN, substantially in-
creases red blood cell production and is of substan-
tial apparent benefit to dialysis and chemotherapy
patients, who can have much more energy with the
extra oxygen-carrying capability created by Epogen.
For example, Epogen has become an issue in re-
cent years in some professional sports (e.g., bicycling
with Lance Armstrong recently, and Jerome Chiotti
before him). These situations reinforce the related
points made earlier about the trade-offs between a
potentially higher quality of life versus an earlier
death. For example, a weak 90-year-old may con-
sider a QOL of 600 preferable to death, whereas an
Olympic athlete who is used to running ten miles a
day may prefer death to a completely sedentary and
deteriorating QOL.
A related point is that Table 1 is only a summary
of the individuals’ potential outcomes in this hypo-
thetical population because it only gives the mean
values of the survival and QOL potential outcomes
within each principal stratum. The more complete
version of Table 1 would also provide the marginal
distributions of all four potential outcomes, in ad-
dition to their means, and moreover, would pro-
vide the joint four-dimensional distribution of the
potential outcomes within each principal stratum.
Having such information would allow individuals to
make the trade-off between death and QOL, but
it is far more difficult to estimate such a table of
joint distributions than simply the means, because
treatment and control potential outcomes are never
jointly observed. We return briefly to this topic af-
ter understanding the simpler problem of estimating
the means given in Table 1 from observable data.
For now let us accept Table 1 with just Y means
in all four principal strata as truth, and consider
next how we learn about this table from observable
data.
3. WHAT WOULD BE OBSERVED IN A
RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT?
Suppose that we conducted a huge completely ran-
domized experiment on a huge random sample from
this population: half get randomized to active treat-
ment and half get randomized to the control. Even
though not blocked on the unknown principal strata,
in expectation, half of each principal stratum will be
exposed to each treatment. This is reflected in Ta-
ble 2 where each row in Table 1 is split in half, with
the top one in each half getting the active treat-
ment, indicated by Z = 1, and the other getting the
control treatment, indicated by Z = 0. Of course, we
do not get to observe all the values in Table 2, and
in fact, do not know the principal strata to which
individual people actually belong.
Suppose now that we permute the rows in Table 2
so that rows that have the same observed treatment
and the same observed survival are adjacent. We
Table 2
Principal strata among the patients, each split by treatment assignment
% Principal Assignment Treatment Control Treatment effect
population stratum Zi Si(T) Y¯i(T) Si (C ) Y¯i(C ) on QOL
10 LL T L 900 L 700 200
10 LL C L 900 L 700 200
20 LD T L 600 D * *
20 LD C L 600 D * *
10 DL T D * L 800 *
10 DL C D * L 800 *
10 DD T D * D * *
10 DD C D * D * *
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trivially obtain Table 3, but of course we still do not
know the splits between the pairs of adjacent rows.
That is, for the first pair of rows, we observe that all
these are people who got treated and lived, and that
these comprise 30% of the people in the experiment;
consequently, the observed survival rate in the ran-
dom half assigned treatment is 60% (= 2 × 30%).
The average QOL for this group will be a 1/3+2/3
mixture of LL and LD , that is, of the averages 900
and 600, and so the observed average for those who
got assigned treatment and lived will equal 700. We
do not observe any control potential outcomes for
these people because they are all treated. For the
second pair of rows in Table 3, we have that they
are observed to be treated and die, and comprise
20% of the population, or 40% of the treated group
dies. Again, no control potential outcomes are ob-
served for these people.
For the third pair of rows, we observe that they
are assigned to control and live, and comprise 20%
of the population, implying a survival rate in the
population under control of 40%. Also they have an
observed average QOL of 750, which arises from the
1/2+1/2 mixture of LL and DL with means 700 and
800, respectively. In these two rows the treated po-
tential outcomes are not observed because the peo-
ple were assigned control. Finally, the last pair of
rows were assigned control, and they were observed
to die, and they comprise 30% of the population,
implying a death rate in the control group of 60%.
No treated potential outcomes are observed for these
people.
The discussion in the previous two paragraphs is
summarized in Table 4, which displays only what
is actually observed in the study. Several features
are noteworthy. First, suppose that we decide to
assess the causal effect of the active control treat-
ment on survival, the “intermediate” outcome. We
get the correct answer: 60% survive when treated
versus 40% when untreated, just as in Table 1. Next
Table 4
Observed data for the example of Tables 1–3
% Treatment Control
population Zi Si(T) Y¯i(T) Si(C ) Y¯i(C )
30 T L 700 ? ?
20 T D * ? ?
20 C ? ? L 750
30 C ? ? D *
suppose that we decide to assess the causal effect of
active treatment versus control treatment on QOL
using only the subjects for whom we have observed
QOL: we would compare the observed average of
700 for the treated group versus the observed aver-
age of 750 for the control group and conclude that,
although the active treatment is good for survival, it
is bad for QOL if you do survive—but this is simply
wrong! The causal effect of the active treatment ver-
sus the control is positive (+200) for the LL group,
which is the only group for which QOL is well de-
fined.
What went wrong with this last analysis compar-
ing mean QOL for survivors? The answer is that
the comparison does not estimate a causal effect.
Rather than comparing treated and control poten-
tial outcomes [i.e., Y (1) and Y (0)] on a common
subset of units (like the LL group), it compares the
average observed treatment potential outcome Y (1)
of 700, which comes from a 1/3+2/3 mixture of LL
and LD , with the average observed control potential
outcome Y (0) of 750, which comes from a 1/2+1/2
mixture of LL and DL. These are different groups
of people, having only some LL people in common,
but even these are in different fractions.
This method of attack, comparing QOL when it
is observed and dropping people who died, although
popular in some settings, is simply wrong in general.
But then what should we do? If we knew the labels
of the principal strata for all the people, we could
simply analyze the data within each stratum, in par-
ticular compare Y (1) and Y (0) in the LL stratum,
but we do not have this information. As Table 5 dis-
plays, instead, each of our observed groups defined
by observed treatment assignment Z and observed
survival Sobs, comprises a mixture of people from
two unobserved, or latent, principal strata.
Table 5
Group classification based on observed treatment assignment
and observed survival indicator OBS(Z,Sobs), and
associated data pattern and possible latent principal strata
Observed group Possible latent
OBS(Z ,Sobs) Z Sobs Y obs principal strata
OBS(T,L) T L ∈R LL, LD
OBS(T,D) T D * DL, DD
OBS(C,L) C L ∈R LL, DL
OBS(C,D) C D * LD, DD
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Table 3
Permuted table for principal strata among the patients, each split by treatment assignment
% Principal Treatment Control Treatment effect
population stratum Zi Si(T) Y¯i(T) Si(C ) Y¯i (C ) on QOL
10 LL T L 900 L 700 200
20 LD T L 600 D * *
10 DL T D * L 800 *
10 DD T D * D * *
10 LL C L 900 L 700 200
10 DL C D * L 800 *
20 LD C L 600 D * *
10 DD C D * D * *
4. POSSIBLE APPROACHES
One possible approach is to treat the problem as
one of missing data, and try to impute, or multi-
ply impute, the “missing data” that are “censored”
by death. But we really already rejected this idea
in the discussion of Section 2: the Y outcomes are
not missing; they are undefined, or defined to be ∗.
Maybe adding some simplifying assumptions would
help?
There are some assumptions that are relatively
standard in similar settings, in particular, where the
intermediate outcome variable indicates compliance
with assigned drug (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin,
1996). In Tables 1–4, the four principal strata could
be called compliers, never-takers, always-takers and
defiers, corresponding to LD , DD , LL and DL, re-
spectively. The analogy here is that people who would
live under treatment but would die under control are
“complying” with the encouragement of the active
treatment to help them.
The first standard assumption (after SUTVA) that
is made in the noncompliance setting is called “mono-
tonicity” or the “no-defier” assumption, which rules
out the DL group. The no-defier assumption can be
reasonable in our QOL setting, but is wrong in the
context of our numerical example because there ex-
ist both LD and DL groups.
The next assumption that is often made in the
noncompliance setting is called “exclusion,” which
asserts that if treatment assignment cannot change
the intermediate outcome, D, it cannot change the
final outcome, Y ; here, that would mean that there
is no treatment effect on Y = QOL for either the
LL group or the DD group. But the causal effect
on QOL for the LL group is precisely what we want
to estimate, and so we cannot assume it to be zero!
So the exclusion assumption does us absolutely no
good. When both monotonicity and exclusion hold,
however, the classical instrumental variables esti-
mate (IVE) can be used to estimate the “complier
average causal effect”; see Angrist, Imbens and Ru-
bin (1996) for extended discussion. In simple set-
tings, the IVE is the simple treatment minus con-
trol estimate for the mean of Y divided by the simple
treatment minus control estimate for the mean of D,
so here would require some imputation of the “miss-
ing” Y values for those who are observed to die. If
we imputed zero for the QOL for those who die,
we would have that IVE = (420−300)/(0.6−0.4) =
600, unrelated to anything real, which is not surpris-
ing because the underlying assumptions justifying
the IVE are both wrong in our example.
Another possible assumption, considered in Zhang
and Rubin (2003), is “stochastic dominance,” which
implies that, on average, the LL group is healthier
under control than the DL group, and the LL group
Table 6
Bounds for treatment effect on QOL in LL for numerical
example
Monotonicity Stochastic
assumption dominance [Lower Bound, Upper Bound]
No No [−200, 200]
Yes No [−150, 0]
No Yes [−100, 150]
Yes Yes [−50, 0]
The first column shows whether the monotonicity assump-
tion (A1) is made, and the second column shows whether the
stochastic dominance assumption (A2) is made. The last col-
umn shows the bounds for the numerical example of Tables
1–4.
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is healthier under treatment than the LD group.
Again, this condition is violated in our numerical
example, as was noted in Section 2 earlier. Large-
sample bounds on the Survivor Average Causal Ef-
fect (i.e., the causal effect in the LL group) are de-
rived in Zhang and Rubin (2003) under monotonic-
ity and stochastic dominance, but are not very use-
ful in our example, as displayed in Table 6, because
none of the assumptions holds. In other examples,
they could be quite useful.
5. THE ROLE FOR COVARIATES
A more successful general approach is to collect
and use covariates that are predictive of both the
intermediate potential outcomes (e.g., here survival)
and the final potential outcomes (e.g., here QOL).
This was done in the actual AMGEN application
because there were several measurements of baseline
FVC (= baseline QOL). Thus at baseline measure-
ments of each patient’s current FVC and the rate
of deteriorating FVC were available, and these were
highly predictive of both survival and of two-year-
later QOL if surviving.
To amplify this point, consider Table 7, which is
identical to Table 1 except with an added left-most
column, labeled X , for a covariate, baseline QOL in
the hypothetical example. The hypothetical means
of X are displayed, and we will assume that the hy-
pothetical variances of X within each principal stra-
tum are small relative to the differences between the
means. We again pretend that we conduct a huge
randomized experiment, with 50% treated and 50%
control, to obtain Table 8, which parallels Table 2
with treated and control pairs of rows. Trying to per-
mute the rows in this table to bring groups adjacent
that are observed to be the same (with respect to
observed X , observed treatment assigned, and ob-
served survival) leaves the table unchanged because,
for example, although the first and third rows are
both treated and survive, they are distinguishable
by their differing baseline QOL distributions. The
observed data then are as in Table 9, from which we
reach the following conclusions.
People with baseline FVC around 800, which is
pretty good, comprise 20% of the population, and
they all survive no matter how treated; the causal
effect on QOL of active versus control for them is
900 − 700 = +200—this conclusion agrees with the
truth in Tables 1 and 7. Next, consider the 40%
of the population with baseline QOL around 500,
which is quite poor. They will survive if treated,
with an average QOL of 600, better than at baseline,
but still poor; without the active treatment, how-
ever, they will die; again, some may prefer death to
poor QOL. For the 20% with baseline FVC around
300, which is very poor, neither active treatment
nor control can prevent death. And finally, for the
20% with the best baseline FVC, around 900, which
is quite good, we see that if not actively treated,
their QOL will decline to 800, still not bad, whereas
if treated they will die. This is unexpected and re-
quires follow-up interviews with their individual doc-
tors (and/or friends and spouses) to determine the
reasons for their deaths, possibly negative side ef-
fects of the drug, or overactivity due to the drugs’
dramatic effects on perceived health. But the point
is that a “super” covariate has allowed the recovery
of the truth in Table 1.
Notice that collecting more measurements of out-
comes does not help in the same way as collecting
covariates, because outcome measurements have dif-
ferent potential outcomes depending on the treat-
ment exposures, and so using outcomes to improve
inference will require some serious modeling efforts
involving new assumptions. Some work on this topic
appears in Zhang (2002), but is an important area
for statistical research because it is common, and
often easy, to collect such repeated measurements
post-randomization.
Another source of information that can be uti-
lized is the distributional shape of the outcome in
the different groups and treatments. For example,
if we knew that QOL measurements were approxi-
mately normally distributed across subjects within
each principal stratum and treatment condition, this
could be very helpful because it would allow stan-
dard mixture modeling tools to be used to help dis-
entangle the normal components (e.g., Dempster,
Laird and Rubin, 1977; Titterington, Smith and
Makov, 1985). This approach is used in the example
in Section 6.
6. THE ROLE FOR DISTRIBUTIONAL
ASSUMPTIONS, SUCH AS NORMALITY
Here we extend the example in Table 1 to include
the distribution of QOL within each of the four prin-
cipal strata to illustrate how such information can
be used to help recover the information in Table 1.
This extension will also lead to a brief discussion
of the more difficult issue of the role of the joint
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Table 7 (=Table 1 with Key Covariate)
Principal strata among the patients
% Principal Treatment Control Treatment effect
X population stratum Si(T ) Y¯i(T ) Si(C) Y¯i(C) on QOL
800 20 LL L 900 L 700 200
500 40 LD L 600 D * *
900 20 DL D * L 800 *
300 20 DD D * D * *
Table 9 (=Table 4 with Key Covariate observed)
Principal Treatment Control
X stratum Zi Si(T ) Y¯i(T ) Si(C) Y¯i(C)
800 LL T L 900 ? ?
800 LL C ? ? L 700
500 LD T L 600 ? ?
500 LD C ? ? D *
900 DL T D * ? ?
900 DL C ? ? L 800
300 DD T D * ? ?
300 DD C ? ? D *
distribution of the never jointly observed potential
outcomes under T and under C.
Again, our example will be extreme to illustrate
ideas, and the actual methods of analysis with real
examples will nearly always involve methods of anal-
ysis based on EM or MCMC methods for mixture
models (e.g., Dempster, Laird and Rubin, 1977;
Titterington, Smith and Makov, 1985; Aitkin and
Rubin, 1985). Specifically, suppose the four marginal
distributions of the QOL potential outcomes within
each of three principal strata where they are well de-
fined are normal (Gaussian): N(900,702) and
N(700,502) for LL when treated and not,N(600,402)
for LD when treated, and N(800,602) for LD when
not treated. Suppose also that the investigators are
confident that the distributions are normal, which
could occur, for example, if the QOL scores were
based on the average of a large set of test items
about activities that the individuals can and can-
not perform. The hypothetical variances tend to be
larger under the active treatment because the drug
has a nonadditive effect, being more effective for
some than for others.
Nothing essential changes in Tables 1–3, except
with the addition of the standard deviation associ-
ated with each mean. But Table 4, giving the ob-
served data, is changed in an important way when
the distributions are given. First, the treated group
that lives is still observed to have mean 700, but
its distribution is markedly nonnormal, with one-
third having mean 900 and standard deviation 70
and two-thirds having mean 600 and standard de-
viation 40. These components are easily observable
as different because of the assumed normality and
the small within-component standard deviations. In
more subtle situations, we would have to use far
Table 8 (=Table 2 with Key Covariate)
Principal strata among the patients, each split by treatment assignment
% Principal Treatment Control Treatment effect
X population stratum Zi Si(T ) Y¯i(T ) Si(C) Y¯i(C) on QOL
800 10 LL T L 900 L 700 200
800 10 LL C L 900 L 700 200
500 20 LD T L 600 D * *
500 20 LD C L 600 D * *
900 10 DL T D * L 800 *
900 10 DL C D * L 800 *
300 10 DD T D * D * *
300 10 DD C D * D * *
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more sophisticated analysis methods, which general-
ize standard mixture modeling techniques cited ear-
lier. Although, in this extreme example, we can dis-
tinguish between the one-third and two-thirds mix-
ture components in the treated group that lives, we
do not yet know which is LL and which is LD , how-
ever. But we do know that LL+LD comprise 60% of
the population, because 60% live in the random half
exposed to the active treatment; thus, either LL is
one-third of the 60%, that is, 20% of the population,
with a N(900,702) distribution when treated, or is
two-thirds of the 60%, that is, 40% of the popula-
tion, with a N(600,402) distribution when treated.
Moving on to the observed QOL distribution for
the 40% who survive in the control group, we will
observe a mean of 750 arising from a half/half mix-
ture of N(800,602) and N(700,502), where one com-
ponent represents LL and one component represents
DL, but which is which? Before addressing this ques-
tion, we note that here, decomposing the two com-
ponents within the surviving subjects in the con-
trol group is not as obvious as in the treated group,
because in the control the means of the two compo-
nents are only about one standard deviation apart—
but this is a standard problem using the aforemen-
tioned mixture modeling algorithms. Now each com-
ponent in the surviving control group is observed
to be one-half of the 40% who live under control;
thus, from the control data, both LL and DL com-
prise 20% of the population. But from the treatment
group, we know that LL is either 20% or 40% of
the population; so combining both pieces of infor-
mation, LL must be 20%. Also, LL’s QOL distri-
bution when treated must therefore be N(900,702)
and LD ’s QOL distribution when treated must be
N(600,402).
Furthermore, when not actively treated, from the
surviving control group, LL’s QOL distribution must
be either N(700,502) or N(800,602)—the observed
data cannot distinguish these two possibilities be-
cause both LL and DL are exactly the same size,
20% of the population. Of course, if we knew which
of LL or LD had a higher mean QOL under control
or which had the larger variance under control, we
would know which was N(800,602). This points out
a fragility in the estimation: as the principal strata
get closer to each other in size or closer in means and
variances, the estimation becomes more difficult.
Nevertheless, we have recovered much of Table 1.
What are uncertain are the mean values of the QOL
column under control and the SACE: under control,
the mean QOL is either 800 for LL and 700 for DL,
or 700 for LL and 800 for DL; and the SACE is either
+100 or +200; in either case treatment is preferable
to control.
7. DISCUSSION
It is not surprising that if we have distributional
information and good covariates, the estimation of
the principal strata can be sharpened, even with-
out assumptions such as stochastic ordering of the
groups. Of course, in general, estimation must in-
volve Markov chain Monte Carlo techniques, likeli-
hoods generally will not be regular, and models may
need to be assessed using posterior predictive checks
(Rubin, 1984; Gelman, Meng and Stern, 1996; Gel-
man, Carlin, Stern and Rubin, 2004).
It is also important to realize that the joint condi-
tional distribution of treatment potential outcomes
(Si(1), Yi(1)) and control potential outcomes
(Si(0), Yi(0)) given covariates is inestimable in the
sense that the likelihood is free of parameters gov-
erning this joint conditional distribution (i.e., the
posterior distribution of these parameters equals their
prior distribution). To address this situation, sensi-
tivity analyses (e.g., Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983)
and the creation of large-sample bounds (e.g., Man-
ski, 2003; Zhang and Rubin, 2003, in this specific
problem) could well be quite helpful and informa-
tive. This joint distribution can be relevant to an in-
dividual’s decision-making for treatment versus con-
trol. Knowing the detail provided by Table 1 beyond
that in Table 4, however, can be helpful for this de-
cision, even without knowledge of the inestimable
joint distribution. For example, a person may decide
that he is in better health than the typical patient
and is therefore more likely to have outcomes like
those either in the LL stratum, who are the health-
iest group when treated, or in the LD stratum, who
are the healthiest group when not treated. Conse-
quently, such a person would be particularly inter-
ested in learning why those in DL die when treated
(e.g., negative side effects versus enjoying a too vig-
orous life), and then use this information to make
a more informed choice than directly available from
Table 4.
In conclusion, I think that causal inference mod-
eling using potential outcomes and principal strat-
ification, with its explicit and transparent assump-
tions, has helped clarify situations that statisticians
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must confront when there exists censoring of out-
comes due to death of units, and has led to the cre-
ation of an approach to estimation that can be quite
beneficial in a variety of difficult settings across a
variety of disciplines.
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